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Abstract
Consumer reviews are now part of everyday decision-making. Yet, the credibility of these re-
views is fundamentally undermined when businesses commit review fraud, creating fake reviews
for themselves or their competitors. We investigate the economic incentives to commit review
fraud on the popular review platform Yelp, using two complementary approaches and datasets.
We begin by analyzing restaurant reviews that are identified by Yelp’s filtering algorithm as
suspicious, or fake – and treat these as a proxy for review fraud (an assumption we provide evi-
dence for). We present four main findings. First, roughly 16% of restaurant reviews on Yelp are
filtered. These reviews tend to be more extreme (favorable or unfavorable) than other reviews,
and the prevalence of suspicious reviews has grown significantly over time. Second, a restaurant
is more likely to commit review fraud when its reputation is weak, i.e., when it has few reviews,
or it has recently received bad reviews. Third, chain restaurants – which benefit less from Yelp
– are also less likely to commit review fraud. Fourth, when restaurants face increased competi-
tion, they become more likely to receive unfavorable fake reviews. Using a separate dataset, we
analyze businesses that were caught soliciting fake reviews through a sting conducted by Yelp.
These data support our main results, and shed further light on the economic incentives behind
a business’s decision to leave fake reviews.
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1 Introduction
Consumer review websites such as Yelp, TripAdvisor, and Angie’s List have become increasingly
popular over the past decade, and now exist for nearly every product and service. Yelp alone
contains more than 70 million reviews of restaurants, barbers, mechanics, and other services, and
has a market capitalization of roughly four billion dollars. Moreover, there is mounting evidence
that these reviews have a direct influence on product sales (see Chevalier and Mayzlin (2006), Luca
(2011)).
As the popularity of these platforms has grown, so have concerns that the credibility of reviews
can be undermined by businesses leaving fake reviews for themselves or for their competitors. There
is considerable anecdotal evidence that this type of cheating is endemic in the industry. For example,
the New York Times recently reported on the case of businesses hiring workers on Mechanical Turk
– an Amazon-owned crowdsourcing marketplace – to post fake 5-star Yelp reviews on their behalf
for as little as 25 cents per review.1 In 2004, Amazon.ca unintentionally revealed the identities of
“anonymous” reviewers, briefly unmasking considerable self-reviewing by book authors.2
Despite the major challenge that review fraud poses for firms, consumers, and review platforms
alike, little is known about the economic incentives behind it. In this paper, we assemble two novel
and complementary datasets from Yelp – one of the industry leaders – to estimate the incidence
of review fraud and to understand the conditions under which it is most prevalent. In the first
dataset, we focus on reviews that have been written for restaurants in the Boston metropolitan
area. Empirically, identifying fake reviews is difficult because the econometrician does not directly
observe whether a review is fake. As a proxy for fake reviews, we use the results of Yelp’s filtering
algorithm that predicts whether a review is genuine or fake. Yelp uses this algorithm to flag
suspicious reviews, and to filter them off of the main Yelp page (we have access to all reviews
that do not directly violate terms of service, regardless of whether they were filtered.) The exact
algorithm is not public information, but the results of the algorithm are. With this in hand, we can
analyze the patterns of review fraud on Yelp. In the second data set, we analyze businesses that
were caught soliciting fake reviews through a sting conducted by Yelp. We use the second dataset
1See “A Rave, a Pan, or Just a Fake?” by David Segal, May’11, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2011/05/
22/your-money/22haggler.html.
2See “Amazon reviewers brought to book” by David Smith, Feb.’04, available at http://www.guardian.co.uk/
technology/2004/feb/15/books.booksnews.
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both to provide support for our use of filtered reviews as a proxy for review fraud, and also to shed
further light on the incentives to leave fake reviews.
Overall, roughly 16% of restaurant reviews are filtered by Yelp. While Yelp’s goal is to filter
fake reviews, the filtering algorithm is imperfect. Therefore, there are both false positives (i.e.,
filtered reviews that are not fake) and false negatives (i.e., fake reviews that were not filtered).
Such misclassification affects our interpretation of filtered reviews in two important ways. First,
the rate of fake reviews on Yelp could potentially be higher or lower than the 16% that are filtered.
Second, the existence of false positives implies that perfectly honest restaurants may sometimes
have their reviews filtered. Similarly, there may be restaurants with no filtered reviews that have
successfully committed review fraud. Hence, we do not use filtered reviews to identify specific
businesses that committed review fraud. Instead, our main focus is on the economic incentives to
commit review fraud. In § 2.4, we provide further empirical support for using filtered reviews as
proxy for review fraud by using data on businesses that were known to have committed review
fraud.
What does a filtered review look like? We first consider the distribution of star ratings. The
data show that filtered reviews tend to be more extreme than published reviews. This observation
relates to a broader literature on the distribution of opinion in user-generated content. Li and Hitt
(2008) show that the distribution of reviews for many products tends to be bimodal, with reviews
tending toward 1- and 5-stars and relatively little in the middle. Li and Hitt (2008) argue that
this can be explained through selection if people are more likely to leave a review after an extreme
experience. Our results suggest that fake reviews also help to explain the observed prevalence of
extreme reviews.
Does review fraud respond to economic incentives, or is it driven mainly by a small number
of restaurants that are intent on gaming the system regardless of the situation? If review fraud
is driven by incentives, then we should see a higher concentration of fraudulent reviews when
the incentives are stronger. Theoretically, restaurants with worse (or less established) reputations
have a stronger incentive to game the system. Consistent with this, we find that a restaurant’s
reputation plays an important role in its decision to leave a fake review. Implementing a difference-
in-differences approach, we find that restaurants are less likely to engage in positive review fraud
when they have more reviews and when they receive positive shocks to their reputation.
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We also find that a restaurant’s “oﬄine” reputation matters. In particular, Luca (2011) finds
that consumer reviews are less influential for chain restaurants, which already have firmly estab-
lished reputations built by extensive marketing and branding. Jin and Leslie (2009) find that
organizational form also affects a restaurant’s performance in hygiene inspections, suggesting that
chains face different incentives. We find that chain restaurants are less likely to leave fake reviews
relative to independent restaurants. This contributes to our understanding of the ways in which a
business’s reputation affects its incentives to engage in fraud.
In addition to leaving reviews for itself, a restaurant may commit review fraud by leaving a
negative review for a competitor. Again using a difference-in-differences approach, we find that
restaurants are more likely to receive negative filtered reviews when there is an increase in com-
petition from independent restaurants serving similar types of food (as opposed to increases in
competition by chains or establishments serving different types of food). The entry of new restau-
rants serving different cuisines has no effect. Our chain results are also consistent with the analysis
of Mayzlin et al. (2014) who find that hotels with independently-owned neighbors are more likely
to receive negative fake reviews. Overall, our results suggest that independent restaurants are more
likely to leave positive fake reviews for themselves, and that fake negative reviews are more likely
to occur when a business has an independent competitor. However, it is not necessarily the same
independent restaurants that are more likely to engage in both positive and negative review fraud.
To reinforce our main interpretation of the results, we then collect a second data set consisting
of businesses that were known to have submitted fake reviews. We exploit the fact that Yelp
recently conducted a series of sting operations to catch businesses in the act of committing review
fraud. During these stings, Yelp responded to businesses that were soliciting fake reviews online.
Businesses that were caught soliciting fake reviews were issued a consumer alert, a banner which is
prominently displayed on offenders’ Yelp pages for three months. We identified 126 businesses that
had received a consumer alert over the preceding three months as of March 2014. There are no
chains among the businesses that were caught leaving fake reviews, which provides strong support
for our chain result. Moreover, cheating businesses have significantly lower Yelp ratings and fewer
reviews relative to other businesses, consistent with our main findings. The cheating businesses also
have much higher rates of algorithmically identified fake reviews relative to our main sample, which
provides further support for the validity of using Yelp’s algorithmic indicator of fake reviews as a
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proxy for review fraud. Overall, this supplemental analysis provides a very different methodological
approach but yields results that reinforce our main analysis.
Our results contribute to a small but growing literature on the challenges to the quality of
user-generated content. The most established literature on the topic of review fraud comes from
computer science, and focuses on developing data-mining algorithms that leverage observable re-
view characteristics, such as textual features, and reviewers’ social networks, to identify abnormal
reviewing patterns (for example, see Feng et al. (2012), Akoglu et al. (2013), Mukherjee et al. (2011,
2012), and Jindal et al. (2010)). A related strand of the literature has focused on constructing a
“gold standard” for fake reviews that can be used as training input for fake review classifiers. For
example, Ott et al. (2012) construct such a fake review corpus by hiring users on Mechanical Turk
– an online labor market – to explicitly write fake reviews. Within the social sciences, researchers
have identified a set of issues around the types of reviews that are left. For example, Li and Hitt
(2008) investigate selection issues in reviewing, where people who purchase a product choose not to
review it. Selection can lead to upward bias for two reasons. First, by revealed preference, people
who purchase a product on average like the product better than those who choose not to purchase
it. Second, people who choose to leave a review may have different preferences than those who
choose not to. In work that is concurrent to but independent from ours, Anderson and Simester
(2014) show that in fact, some people who choose not to buy a product still leave a review. Despite
these issues with online reviews, Gao et al. (2015) find a high correlation between an oﬄine measure
of physician quality and the same physicians’ online ratings, suggesting that online reviews – at
least in their setting – approximate the distribution of consumer opinion. As mentioned above,
our results are also complementary to findings by Mayzlin et al. (2014), who investigate promo-
tional reviews in the context of hotels, doing a cross platform comparison between Expedia and
TripAdvisor.
In contrast with prior work, our analysis considers a panel data set, which allows us to perform
a variety of new analyses including looking at the growth of review fraud over time, and the role of
changes in market structure, competition, and reputation. Ours is also the first study to analyze
businesses that are confirmed to have solicited fake reviews, drawing on Yelp’s sting and providing
a first look at the characteristics of businesses that are known to have attempted review fraud.
Taken in aggregate, our findings suggest that positive review fraud is driven by changes in a
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Figure 1: Reviewing activity for Boston restaurants from Yelp’s founding through 2012.
restaurant’s own reputation, while negative review fraud is driven by changing patterns of compe-
tition. For platforms looking to curtail gaming, this provides insights into the extent of gaming,
as well as the circumstances in which this is more prevalent. Our findings also shed light on the
ethical decisions of firms, which are committing fraud in response to changes in economic incentives.
Finally, our work is closely related to the literature on organizational form, showing that incentives
by independent restaurants are quite different from incentives of chains.
2 Empirical Context and Data
2.1 About Yelp
Our analysis investigates reviews from Yelp , which is a consumer review platform where users can
review local businesses such as restaurants, bars, hair salons, and many other services. At the time
of this study, Yelp receives approximately 130 million unique visitors per month, and counts over
70 million reviews in its collection. It is the dominant review site for restaurants. For these reasons,
Yelp is a compelling setting in which to investigate review fraud. For a more detailed description
of Yelp in general, see Luca (2011).
In this analysis, we focus on restaurant reviews in the metropolitan area of Boston, MA. We
include in our analysis every Yelp review that was written from the founding of Yelp in 2004 through
2012, other than the roughly 1% of reviews that violate Yelp’s terms of service (for example, reviews
that contain offensive or discriminatory language). In total, our dataset contains 316,415 reviews
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for 3,625 restaurants. Of these reviews, 50,486 (approximately 16%) have been filtered by Yelp.
Figure 1a displays quarterly totals of published and filtered reviews on Yelp. Yelp’s growth in
terms of the number of reviews that are posted, and the increasing number of reviews that are
filtered, are both evident in this figure. While 16% of reviews are identified as suspicious in our
data, there is likely significant variation across platforms and even within a platform in the extent
of suspicious activity. This depends on factors including the extent to which reviews influence
demand in a given platform as well as the extent to which platforms make it difficult to leave a
review. Our findings here are higher than some previous estimates such as Ott et al. (2012). This
difference is likely in part due to construction of the training data set used by Ott et al. (2012) (a
limitation the authors acknowledge); the fact that Ott et al. (2012) rely only on text features to
identify fraudulent reviews whereas Yelp’s algorithm uses more markers and can potentially catch
more fake reviews; and, finally due to the fact that Ott et al. (2012) use an earlier data sample,
which in our data would have had lower rates of review fraud.
2.2 Fake and Filtered Reviews
The main challenge in empirically identifying review fraud is that we cannot directly observe
whether a review is fake. The situation is further complicated by the lack of single standard
for what makes review “fake.” The Federal Trade Commission’s truth-in-advertising rules3 pro-
vide some useful guidelines: reviews must be “truthful and substantiated,” non-deceptive, and any
material connection between the reviewer and the business being reviewed must be disclosed. For
example, reviews by the business owner, his or her family members, competitors, a disgruntled
ex-employee, or reviewers that have been compensated violate these guidelines unless these connec-
tions are disclosed. Not every review can be as unambiguously classified. The case of a business
owner nudging consumers by providing them with instructions on how to review his business is in
a legal grey area. Most review sites – whose objective is to collect reviews that are as objective
as possible – discourage business owners from incentivizing real customers to leave reviews. The
reason is simple: businesses are likely to only encourage customers who are having a good expe-
rience to leave reviews, resulting – just like review fraud – in a positively biased review sample.
3See “Guides Concerning the Use of Endorsements and Testimonials in Advertising,” available at http://ftc.
gov/os/2009/10/091005revisedendorsementguides.pdf.
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Our results in this paper are likely driven in part by both processes, which share similar underlying
economic incentives and result in an overall positive review bias.
To work around the limitation of not observing fake reviews, we begin by exploiting a unique
Yelp feature: Yelp is the only major review site we know of that allows access to filtered reviews –
reviews that Yelp has classified as illegitimate using a combination of algorithmic techniques, simple
heuristics, and human expertise. Filtered reviews are not published on Yelp’s main listings, and
they do not count towards calculating a business’ average star-rating. Nevertheless, a determined
Yelp visitor can see a business’ filtered reviews after solving a puzzle known as a CAPTCHA.4
Filtered reviews are, of course, only imperfect indicators of fake reviews. Our work contributes
to the literature on review fraud by developing a method that uses an imperfect indicator of fake
reviews to empirically identify the circumstances under which fraud is prevalent. This technique
translates to other settings where such an imperfect indicator is available, and relies on the following
assumption: that the proportion of fake reviews is strictly smaller among the reviews Yelp publishes
than among the reviews Yelp filters. We consider this to be a modest assumption whose validity
can be qualitatively evaluated. In § 3, we formalize the assumption, suggest a method of evaluating
its validity, and use it to develop our empirical methodology for identifying the incentives of review
fraud.
2.3 Characteristics of filtered reviews
To the extent that Yelp is a content curator rather than a content creator, there is a direct interest
in understanding reviews that Yelp has filtered. While Yelp purposely makes the filtering algorithm
difficult to reverse engineer, we are able to test for differences in the observed attributes of published
and filtered reviews.
Figure 1b displays the proportion of reviews that have been filtered by Yelp over time. The spike
in the beginning results from a small sample of reviews posted in the corresponding quarters. After
this, there is a clear upward trend in the prevalence of what Yelp considers to be fake reviews. Yelp
retroactively filters reviews using the latest version of its detection algorithm. Therefore, a Yelp
4A CAPTCHA is a puzzle originally designed to distinguish humans from machines. It is commonly implemented
by asking users to accurately transcribe a piece of text that has been intentionally blurred – a task that is easier for
humans than for machines. Yelp uses CAPTCHAs to make access to filtered reviews harder for both humans and
machines. For more on CAPTCHAs, see Von Ahn et al. (2003).
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review can be initially filtered, but subsequently published (and vice versa.) Hence, the increasing
trend seems to reflect the growing incentives for businesses to leave fake reviews as Yelp grows in
influence, rather than improvements in Yelp’s fake-review detection technology.
Should we expect the distribution of ratings for a given restaurant to reflect the unbiased
distribution of consumer opinions? The answer to this question is likely no. Empirically, Hu et al.
(2006) show that reviews on Amazon are highly dispersed, and in fact often bimodal (roughly 50%
of products on Amazon have a bimodal distribution of ratings). Theoretically, Li and Hitt (2008)
point to the fact that people choose which products to review, and may be more likely to rate
products after having an extremely good or bad experience. This would lead reviews to be more
dispersed than actual consumer opinion. This selection of consumers can undermine the quality of
information that consumers receive from reviews.
We argue that fake reviews may also contribute to the large dispersion that is often observed in
consumer ratings. To see why, consider what a fake review might look like: fake reviews may consist
of a business leaving favorable reviews for itself, or unfavorable reviews for its competitors. There
is little incentive for a business to leave a mediocre review. Hence, the distribution of fake reviews
should tend to be more extreme than that of legitimate reviews. Figure 2a shows the distributions
of published and filtered review on Yelp. The contrast between the two distributions is consistent
with these predictions. Legitimate reviews are unimodal with a sharp peak at 4 stars. By contrast,
the distribution of fake reviews is bimodal with spikes at 1 star and 5 stars. Hence, in this context,
fake reviews appear to exacerbate the dispersion that is often observed in online consumer ratings.
In Figure 2b we break down individual reviews by the total number of reviews their authors
have written, and display the percentage of filtered reviews for each group. Yelp users who have
contributed more reviews are less likely to have their reviews filtered.
We estimate the characteristics of filtered reviews in more detail with the following linear
probability model:
Filteredij = bi + x
′
ijβ + ij , (1)
where the dependent variable Filteredij indicates whether the j
th review of business i was filtered,
bi is a business fixed effect, and xij is vector of review and reviewer characteristics including: star
rating, (log of) length in characters, (log of) total number of reviewer reviews, and a dummy for
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Figure 2: Characteristics of filtered reviews.
the reviewer having a Yelp-profile picture. We present these results in the first column in Table 1.
In line with our observations so far, we find that reviews with extreme ratings are more likely to
be filtered – all else equal, 1- and 5-star review are roughly 3 percentage points more likely to be
filtered than 3-star reviews. We also find that Yelp’s review filter is sensitive to the review and
reviewer attributes included in our model. For example, longer reviews, or reviews by users with a
larger review count are less likely to be filtered. Beyond establishing some characteristics of Yelp’s
filter, this analysis also points to the need for controlling for potential algorithmic biases when
using filtered reviews as a proxy for fake reviews. We explain our approach in dealing with this
issue in § 3.
2.4 Review fraud sting
Our main analysis takes filtered reviews as a proxy for fake reviews. However, one might be
concerned that we are reverse engineering Yelp’s algorithm rather than analyzing fraud. To support
our interpretation, and to provide further insight into the economics of review fraud, we collect
and analyze a second dataset consisting of businesses that were caught in the act of soliciting fake
reviews.
This second dataset derives from a series of sting operations that Yelp began performing in
October 2012. The goal of these stings was to uncover businesses attempting to buy fake reviews.5
5Yelp’s official announcement of the sting operations: http://officialblog.yelp.com/2012/10/
consumer-alerts-because-you-might-like-to-know.html
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Yelp performed the stings by looking for fake review solicitations on classified ads boards like
Craigslist – the sting did not rely on the filter in any way. By responding to these solicitations,
Yelp was able to expose the identities of the businesses that were attempting to commit review
fraud. Businesses which Yelp determined to be buying fake reviews received a notice on their Yelp
pages. The notice, known as a consumer alert, lasts for at least 90 days, and may be renewed if a
business does not seize its efforts to commit review fraud. Yelp continues to perform sporadic sting
operations to the present day.
During March 2014, we collected data from all US businesses listed on Yelp. We identified 126
businesses – none of which are Boston restaurants – that had received a consumer alert over the
prior 90 days, and collected their entire review histories. In total, the dataset of businesses that
received consumer alerts contains 2,233 published and 8,246 filtered reviews.
We use these data for two purposes. First, we cross-validate Yelp’s algorithmic results to support
our use of filtered reviews as a proxy for fake reviews (in this secion). Then, in § 4.2, we use this
dataset for direct evidence on the role of economic incentives in review fraud.
To cross-validate the accuracy of Yelp’s filter, we analyze the rate of filtered reviews among
businesses that were caught in the sting (which did not affect the filter). We hypothesize that if
filtered reviews are a reasonable proxy for fake reviews, then businesses caught in the sting should
also have higher rates of filtered reviews. Our sting dataset supports this hypothesis: among
businesses that received a consumer alert the average fraction of reviews that are filtered is 79%,
compared to 19% for the average Boston restaurant. This suggests that Yelp’s filtering algorithm
is doing a reasonable job of identifying review fraud and provides support for our use of filtered
reviews as a proxy for review fraud.
Next, because we know for certain that the businesses exposed in stings have attempted review
fraud, we check whether the characteristics of filtered reviews on this restricted sample of businesses
are similar to filtered reviews in our main sample of Boston restaurants. Both in the sample of all
Boston restaurants and in the sample of businesses caught in the sting, we find that filtered reviews
are more likely to be written by reviewers with less established reputations, as measured by their
number of prior reviews, their number of Yelp friends, and whether or not they have a profile photo
posted on Yelp. We report these results in Table 2. In the first and second columns of Table 2,
focusing on businesses that received a consumer alert, we compare reviewers whose reviews were
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published with reviewers whose reviews were filtered. Average users whose reviews were filtered
have written fewer reviews than reviewers whose reviews were published (3 vs 108). They also have
fewer friends on Yelp’s social network (2 vs 66), and are less likely to have a photo associated with
their profile (20% vs 77%). Our results for Boston restaurants mirror our results for businesses that
received a consumer alert: reviewers whose reviews were filtered have written fewer reviews than
reviewers whose reviews were published (10 vs 137), have fewer friends on Yelp’s social network (5
vs 61), and are less likely to have a photo associated with their profile (82% vs 4%). Therefore, the
observable characteristics of the users behind these filtered reviews coincide with the characteristics
of users who likely left fake reviews. The similar patterns that emerge across these two samples
provides further support for our use of filtered reviews as a proxy for fake.
In summary, even though review fraud is generally unobservable, Yelp’s sting operations have
enabled us to observe businesses that are known to have attempted review fraud. Using the reviews
of these known cheaters, we show that businesses known to attempt review fraud have higher rates
of filtered reviews. Moreover, characteristics of filtered reviews, which we use as a proxy for review
fraud in our main analysis, do not look systematically different among the businesses that are known
to have committed review fraud relative to the population at large. Overall, these results help to
cross-validate the results from Yelp’s filter and to provide empirical support for our interpretation
of filtered reviews.
3 Empirical Strategy
In this section, we introduce our empirical strategy for identifying the economic incentives behind
Yelp review fraud. Ideally, if we could recognize fake reviews, we would estimate the following
regression model:
f∗it = x
′
itβ + bi + τt + it (i = 1 . . . N ; t = 1 . . . T ), (2)
where f∗it is the number of fake reviews business i received during period t, xit is a vector of time-
varying covariates measuring a business’ economic incentives to engage in review fraud, β are the
structural parameters of interest, bi and τt are business and time fixed effects, and the it is an error
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term. The inclusion of business fixed effects allows us to control for unobservable time-invariant,
business-specific incentives for Yelp review fraud. For example, Mayzlin et al. (2014) find that
the management structure of hotels in their study is associated with review fraud. To the extent
that management structure is time-invariant, business fixed effects allow us to control for this
unobservable characteristic. Hence, when looking at incentives to leave fake reviewers over time,
we include restaurant fixed effects. However, we also run specifications without a restaurant fixed
effect so that we can analyze time-invariant characteristics as well. Similarly, the inclusion of time
fixed effects allows us to control for unobservable, common across businesses, time-varying shocks.
As is often the case in studies of gaming and corruption (e.g., see Mayzlin et al. (2014), Duggan
and Levitt (2002), and references therein) we do not directly observe f∗it, and hence we cannot esti-
mate the parameters of this model. To proceed, we assume that Yelp’s filter possesses some positive
predictive power in distinguishing fake reviews from genuine ones. Is this a credible assumption to
make? Yelp appears to espouse the view that it is. While Yelp is secretive about how its review
filter works, it states that “the filter sometimes affects perfectly legitimate reviews and misses some
fake ones, too,” but “does a good job given the sheer volume of reviews and the difficulty of its
task.”6 Our analysis of businesses that were caught committing review fraud in § 2.4 provides
further empirical evidence supporting our use of filtered reviews as a proxy for review fraud. In
addition, we suggest a subjective test to assess the assumption’s validity: for any business, one can
qualitatively check whether the fraction of suspicious-looking reviews is larger among the reviews
Yelp publishes, rather than among the ones it filters.
Formally, we assume that Pr[Filtered|¬Fake] = a0, and Pr[Filtered|Fake] = a0 + a1, for con-
stants a0 ∈ [0, 1], and a1 ∈ (0, 1 − a0], i.e., that the probability a fake review is filtered is strictly
greater than the probability a genuine review is filtered. Letting f∗itk be a latent indicator of the
kth review of businesses i at time t being fake, we model the filtering process for a single review as:
fitk = α0(1− f∗itk) + (α0 + α1)f∗itk + uitk, (3)
where uitk is a zero-mean independent error term. We relax this independence assumption later.
6See “What is the filter?”, available at http://www.yelp.com/faq#what_is_the_filter.
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Summing of over all nit reviews for business i in period t we obtain:
nit∑
k=1
fitk =
nit∑
k=1
[α0(1− f∗itk) + (α0 + α1)f∗itk + uitk]
fit = α0nit + α1f
∗
it + uit (4)
where uit is a composite error term. Substituting Equation 2 into the above yields the following
model:
yit = a0nit + a1
(
x′itβ + bi + τt + it
)
+ uit. (5)
It consists of observed quantities, unobserved fixed effects, and an error term. We can estimate this
model using a within estimator which wipes out the fixed effects. However, while we can identify
the reduced-form parameters a1β, we cannot separately identify the vector of structural parameters
of interest, β. Therefore, we can only test for the presence of fraud through the estimates of the
reduced-form parameters, a1β. Furthermore, since a1 ≤ 1, these estimates will be lower bounds to
the structural parameters, β.
3.1 Controlling for biases in Yelp’s filter
So far, we have not accounted for possible biases in Yelp’s filter related to specific review attributes.
But what if uit is endogenous? For example, the filter may be more likely to filter shorter reviews,
regardless of whether they are fake. To some extent, we can control for these biases. Let zitk be a
vector of review attributes. We incorporate filter biases by modeling the error them uitk as follows:
uitk = z
′
itkγ + uˆitk (6)
where uˆitk is now an independent error term. This in turn suggests the following regression model
yit = a0nit + a1
(
x′itβ + bi + τt + it
)
+
nit∑
k
z′itkγ + uˆit. (7)
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In zitk, we include controls for: review length, the number of prior reviews a review’s author has
written, and whether the reviewer has a profile picture associated with his or her account. As we
saw in § 2, these attributes help explain a large fraction of the variance in filtering. A limitation
of our work is that we cannot control for filtering biases in attributes that we do not observe, such
as the IP address of a reviewer, or the exact time a review was submitted. If these unobserved
attributes are endogenous, our estimation will be biased. Equation 7 constitutes our preferred
specification.
4 Review Fraud and Own Reputation
This section discusses the main results, which are at the restaurant-month level and presented
in Tables 4 and 5. Restaurants in the Boston area receive, on average, approximately 0.1 1-star
published reviews per month, and 0.37 published 5-star reviews. Table 3 contains detailed summary
statistics – at the restaurant-month level – of all variables in subsequent analyses. Because some of
our analyses compare independent and chain restaurants we also report separate summary statistics
for these two types of restaurants.
We focus on understanding the relationship between a restaurant’s reputation and its incentives
to leave a fake review, with the overarching hypothesis that restaurants with a more established or
more favorable reputation have less of an incentive to leave fake reviews. While there isn’t a single
variable that fully captures a restaurant’s reputation, there are several relevant metrics, including
the number of recent positive and negative reviews, and an indicator for whether the restaurant is
a chain, or an independent business. One important feature of Yelp is that it provides more direct
measures of a business’s reputation than would otherwise be observable.
Our main empirical strategy is a difference-in-differences approach. By analyzing changes in
a restaurant’s reputation over time, we difference out market-level changes in the propensity to
leave a fake review. Specifically, we estimate Equation 7, where we include in the vector xit the
following parameters: the number of 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5 star reviews received in period t − 1; the
log of the total number of reviews the business had received up to and including period t− 1; and
the age of the business in period t, measured in (fractional) years. To investigate the incentives
of positive review fraud, we estimate specifications with the number of filtered 5-star reviews per
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restaurant-month as the dependent variable. These results are presented in Table 4. Similarly, to
investigate negative review fraud, we repeat the analysis with the number of filtered 1-star reviews
per restaurant-month as the dependent variable. We present these results in Table 5. Next, we
discuss our results in detail.
4.1 Results: worsening reputation drives positive review fraud
Low ratings increase incentives for positive review fraud, and high ratings decrease
them As a restaurant’s rating increases, it receives more business (Luca 2011), and hence may
have less incentive to game the system. Consistent with this hypothesis, in the first column of
Table 4, we observe a positive and significant impact of receiving 1- and 2-star reviews in period
t−1 on the extent of review fraud in the current period. Conversely, 4- and 5-star published reviews
in the previous period lead to a drop in the prevalence of fake reviews in the current period. In
other words, a positive change to a restaurant’s reputation – whether the result of legitimate, or
fake reviews – reduces the incentives of engaging in review fraud, while a negative change increases
them.
One way to gauge the economic signficance of these effects is by comparing the magnitudes of
the estimated coefficients to the average value of the dependent variable. For example, on average,
restaurants in our dataset received approximate 0.1 filtered 5-star reviews per month. Meanwhile,
the coefficient estimates in the first column of Table 4 suggest that an additional 1-star review
published in the previous period is associated with an extra 0.01 filtered 5-star reviews in the
current period, i.e., an increase constituting approximately 10% of the observed monthly average.
Furthermore, recalling that most likely a0 + a1 < 1 (that is to say, Yelp does not identify every
single fake review), this number is a conservative estimate for the increase in positive review fraud.
To assess the robustness of these results, we re-estimate the above model including the 6-month
leads of published 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5 star reviews counts. We hypothesize that while to some extent
restaurants may anticipate reputational shocks, we should see little to know correlation between
current review fraud and future shocks to reputation. Column 2 of Table 4 suggests that this is
indeed the case. The coefficients of the 6-month lead variables are near zero, and not statistically at
conventional significance levels, with the exception of the 6-month lead of 5 star reviews (p < .05).
Our experiments with short and longer leads did not yield substantially different conclusions.
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Having more reviews reduces incentives for positive review fraud As a restaurant re-
ceives more reviews, the benefit to each additional review decreases (since Yelp focuses on the
average rating). Hence, we expect restaurants to have stronger incentives to submit fake reviews
when they have relatively few reviews. To test this hypothesis, we include the logarithm of the
current number of reviews a restaurant has in our model. Consistent with this, we find that there
exists a negative, statistically significant association between the total number of reviews a busi-
ness has received up to previous time period, and the intensity of review fraud during the current.
Table 4 suggests that restaurants are more likely to engage in positive review fraud earlier in their
life-cycles. The coefficient of log Review Count is negative, and statistically significant across all
four specifications. These results are consistent with the theory of Branco and Villas-Boas (2011),
who predict that market participants whose eventual survival depends on their early performance
are more likely to break rules as they enter the market.
Chain restaurants leave fewer positive fake reviews Chain affiliation is an important source
of a restaurant’s reputation. Local and independent restaurants tend to be less well-known than
national chains (defined in this paper as those with 15 or more nationwide outlets). Because of
this, chains have substantially different reputational incentives than independent restaurants. In
fact, Jin and Leslie (2009) find that chain restaurants maintain higher standards of hygiene as a
consequence of facing stronger reputational incentives. Luca (2011) finds that the revenues of chain
restaurants are not significantly affected by changes in their Yelp ratings, since chains tend to rely
heavily on other forms of promotion and branding to establish their reputation. In addition to the
fact that chains receive less benefit from reviews, they may also incur a larger cost if they are caught
committing review fraud because they entire brand could be hurt. For example, if one McDonald’s
gets caught submitting a fake review, all McDonald’s may suffer as a result. This observation is
consistent with the mechanism identified by Mayzlin et al. (2014). Hence, chains have less to gain
from review fraud.
In order to test this hypothesis, we exclude restaurant fixed effects, since they prevent us from
identifying chain effects (or, any other time-invariant effect for this matter.) Instead, we implement
a random effects (RE) design. One unappealing assumption underlying the RE estimator is the
orthogonality between observed variables and unobserved time-invariant restaurant characteristics,
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i.e., that E[x′itbi] = 0. To address this issue, we follow the approach proposed by Mundlak (1978),
which allows for (a specific form) correlation between observables and unobservables. Specifically,
we assume that bi = x¯iγ + ζi, and we implement this correction by incorporating the group means
of time-variant variables in our model. Empirically, we find that chain restaurants are less likely
to engage in review fraud. The estimates of the time-varying covariates in the model remain
essentially unchanged compared to the fixed effects specification in the first column of Table 4,
suggesting, as Mundlak (1978) highlights, that the RE model we estimate is properly specified.
With all controls, the chain coefficient equates to roughly a 5% lower rate of review fraud among
chain restaurants.
Other determinants of positive review fraud Businesses can claim their pages on Yelp after
undergoing a verification process. Once a business page has been claimed, its owner can respond
to consumer reviews publicly or in private, add pictures and information about the business (e.g.
opening hours and menus), and monitor the number of visitors to the business’ Yelp page. 1,964
of all restaurants had claimed their listings by the time we collected our dataset. While we do not
observe when these listings were claimed, we expect that businesses with a stronger interest in their
Yelp presence, as signaled by claiming their pages, will engage in more review fraud.
To test this hypothesis, we estimate the same random effects model as in the previous section
with one additional time-invariant dummy variable indicating whether a restaurant’s Yelp page
has been claimed or not. The results are shown in the fourth column of Table 4. In line with our
hypothesis, we find that businesses with claimed pages are significantly more likely to post fake
5-star reviews. While this finding doesn’t fit into our reputational framework, we view it as an
additional credibility check that enhances the robustness our analysis.
Negative review fraud Table 5 repeats our analysis with filtered 1-star reviews as the depen-
dent variable. The situations in which we expect negative fake reviews to be most prevalent are
qualitatively different from the situations in which we expect positive fake reviews to be most
prevalent. Negative fake reviews are likely left by competitors (see Mayzlin et al. (2014)), and may
be subject to different incentives (for example, based on the proximity of competitors). We have
seen that positive fake reviews are more prevalent when a restaurant’s reputation has deteriorated
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or is less established. In contrast, our results show that negative fake reviews are less responsive
to a restaurant’s recent ratings, but are still somewhat responsive to the number of reviews that
have been left. In other words, while a restaurant is more likely to leave a favorable review for
itself as its reputation deteriorates, this does not drive competitors to leave negative reviews. At
the same time, both types of fake reviews are more prevalent when a restaurant’s reputation is less
established, i.e. when it has fewer reviews.
Column 2 of Table 5 incorporates 6-month leads of 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5 star review counts. As for
the case of positive review fraud, we hypothesize that future ratings should not affect the present
incentives of a restaurant’s competitors to leave negative fake reviews. Indeed, we find that the
coefficients of all 6 lead variables are near zero, and not statistically significant at conventional
levels.
As additional robustness checks, we estimate the same RE models as above, which include
chain affiliation, and whether a restaurant has claimed its Yelp page as dummy variables. A priori,
we expect no association between either of these two indicators and the number of negative fake
reviews a business attracts from its competitors. A restaurant cannot prevent its competitors from
manipulating its own reviews by being part of chain, or claiming its Yelp page. Indeed, our results,
shown in columns 2 & 3 of Table 5, indicate that neither effect is significant, confirming our
hypothesis.
4.2 Robustness check: Determinants of fraud using sting data
Our main analysis suggests that a business is more likely to commit positive review fraud when its
reputation is weak. To provide further evidence on this, we investigate the reputation of known
fraudsters relative to other businesses. In Table 8, we present the average star-rating, published
and filtered review counts, and percentage of filtered reviews for businesses that received consumer
alerts. Overall, we find that the characteristics of these businesses match our predictions. Consistent
with our main analysis, we find that known fraudsters have low ratings and relatively few reviews
– on average, 2.6 stars and 18 reviews. In contrast, the average Boston restaurant, which is a
priori less likely to have committed review fraud, has 3.5 stars and 86 published reviews. This
comparison supports a connection between economic incentives and review fraud. In addition, we
observe no chains among the businesses that were caught leaving fake reviews through the sting,
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providing further support for our chain result. Overall, the sting data reinforce the interpretation
of our results by showing that the types of businesses that were caught committing review fraud
match the predictions of our main empirical analysis.
5 Review Fraud and Competition
We next turn our attention to analyzing the impact of competition on review fraud. The prevailing
viewpoint on negative fake reviews is that they are left by a restaurant’s competitors to tarnish
its reputation, while we have no similar prediction about the relationship between positive fake
reviews and competition.
5.1 Quantifying competition between restaurants
To identify the effect of competition on review fraud, we exploit the fact that the restaurant
industry has a relatively high attrition rate. While anecdotal and published estimates of restaurant
failure rates vary widely, most reported estimates are high enough to suggest that over its lifetime
an individual restaurant will experience competition of varying intensity. In a recent study, Parsa
et al. (2005) put the one-year survival probability of restaurants in Columbus, OH at approximately
75%, while an American Express study cited by the same authors estimates it at just about 10%.
At the time we collected our dataset, 17% of all restaurants were identified by Yelp as closed.
To identify a restaurant’s competitors, we have to consider which restaurant characteristics drive
diners’ decisions. While location is intuitively one of the factors driving restaurant choice, Auty
(1992) finds that food type and quality rank higher in the list of consumers’ selection criteria, and
therefore, restaurants are also likely to compete on the basis of these attributes. These observations,
in addition to the varying incentives faced by chains, motivate a breakdown of competition by chain
affiliation, food type, and proximity. To determine whether two restaurants are of the same type we
exploit Yelp’s fine-grained restaurant categorization. On Yelp, each restaurant is associated with
up to three categories (such as Cambodian, Buffets, Gluten-Free, etc.) If two restaurants share at
least one Yelp category, we deem them to be of the same type.
Next, we need to address the issue of proximity between restaurants and spatial competition.
One straightforward heuristic involves defining all restaurants within a fixed threshold distance of
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each other as competitors. This approach is implemented by Mayzlin et al. (2014), who define
two hotels as competitors if they are located with half a kilometer of each other. Bollinger et al.
(2010) employ the same heuristic to identify pairs of competing Starbucks and Dunkin Donuts.
However, this simple rule may not be as well-suited to defining competition among restaurants. On
one hand, location is likely a more important criterion for travelers than for diners. This suggests
using a larger threshold to define restaurant competition. On the other hand, the geographic
density of restaurants is much higher than that of hotels, or that of Starbucks and Dunkin Donuts
branches.7 Therefore, even a low threshold might cast too wide a net. For example, applying
a half kilometer cutoff to our dataset results, on average, in approximately 67 competitors per
restaurant. Mayzlin et al. (2014) deal with this issue by excluding the 25 largest (and presumably
highest hotel-density) US cities from their analysis. Finally, it is likely that our results will be more
sensitive to a particular choice of threshold given that restaurants are closer to each other than
hotels. Checking the robustness of our results against too many different threshold values raises the
concern of multiple hypothesis testing. Taken together, these observations suggest that a single,
sharp threshold rule might not adequately capture the competitive landscape in our setting.
In response to these concerns, a natural alternative is to weigh competitors by their distance.
Distance-based heuristics can be generalized using the idea smoothing kernel weights. Specifically,
let the impact of restaurant j on restaurant i be:
wij = K
(
dij
h
)
, (8)
where dij is the distance between the two restaurants, K is a kernel function, and h is a positive
parameter called the kernel bandwidth. Note that weights are symmetric, i.e., wij = wji. Then,
depending on the choice of K and h, wij provides different ways to capture the relationship between
distance and competition. For example, the threshold heuristic can be implemented using a uniform
kernel:
KU (u) = 1{|u|≤1}, (9)
7Yelp reports 256 hotels in the Boston area, compared to almost four thousand restaurants.
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where 1{...} is the indicator function. Using a bandwidth of h, KU assigns unit weights to competi-
tors within a distance of h, and zero to competitors located farther away.8
Similarly, we can define the Gaussian kernel:
Kφ(u) = e
− 1
2
u2 , (10)
which produces spatially smooth weights that are continuous in u, and follow the pattern of a
Gaussian density function. The kernel bandwidth determines how sharply weights decline, and
in empirical applications it is often a subjective, domain-dependent choice. We note that there
exists an extensive theoretical literature on optimal bandwidth selection to minimize specific loss
functions which is beyond the scope of this work (e.g., see Wand and Jones (1995) and references
within).
We approximate the true operating dates of restaurants using their first and last reviews as
proxies. Specifically, we take the date of the first review to be the opening date, and if a restaurant
is labeled by Yelp as closed, we take the date of the last review as the closing date. While this
method is imperfect, we expect that any measurement error it introduces will only attenuate the
measured impact of competition. To see this, consider a currently closed restaurant that operated
past the date of its last review. Then, any negative fake reviews its competitors received between
its miscalculated closing date and its true closing date cannot be attributed to competition. We
acknowledge, but consider unlikely, the possibility that restaurants sharply change the rate at
which they manipulate reviews during periods we misidentify them as being closed. In this case,
measurement error can introduce bias in either direction when estimating competition effects.
Putting together all of the above pieces, we can now operationalize the competition faced by
restaurant i. We break down competitors into four categories: same cuisine-type independents,
same cuisine-type chains, different cuisine-type independents, and different cuisine-type chains.
Let wit be a vector containing these four measures of different kinds of competition. Its first
8Kernel functions are usually normalized to have unit integrals. Such scaling constants are inconsequential in our
analysis, and hence we omit them for simplicity.
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element, which measures competition by independent restaurants of the same type, is defined as:
w
(1)
it =
∑
i 6=j
wij1{independentj}1{same typeij}1{openjt}. (11)
The successive indicator functions denote whether j is an independent restaurant, whether i and j
share a Yelp category, and whether j is operating at time t. We define the remaining three elements
of wit capturing the impact of different type independent restaurants, and same and different type
chains in a similar manner.
5.2 Results: competition encourages negative review fraud
We now estimate the impact of competition on review fraud by augmenting our base model of
Equation 7 with the vector wit, a set of four time-varying variables measuring competition intensity
for restaurant i at time t:
yit = a0nit + a1
x′itβ + w′itγ + nit∑
j=1
z′itjγ + bi + τt + 
 , (12)
As before, we employ a fixed-effects estimator to rule out any time-invariant endogenous effects. We
are especially concerned by purely spatial endogeneity that could arise by incorporating location-
dependent variables in our model. For example, restaurants collocated in a shopping mall could
exhibit correlated behavior because of their shared location. Our methodology precludes these
issues.
We report our results in Table 6. The inclusion of wit does not significantly alter our estimates
of the remaining coefficients (as reported in Tables 4 & 5), and hence we omit them from this table
for simplicity of presentation. Our first specification estimates the effect of competition on 1-star
review fraud using a Gaussian kernel with bandwidth 1km. Using this particular bandwidth, the
weight of a restaurant half a kilometer away is approximately 0.6 times the weight of restaurant in
exactly the same location, while the weight of any restaurant at a distance of at least 3km becomes
negligibly small.
Several interesting patterns emerge in our analysis. First, we find that increased competi-
tion from same-type independent restaurants is associated with increased negative review fraud.
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Specifically, a unit increase in the competition measure associated with same-type, independent
restaurants – which would result, for example, from a same-type, independent competitor open-
ing across the street – is associated with 0.0016 (p < 0.001) additional 1-star filtered reviews per
month. For the average business, which receives 0.05 1-star filtered reviews each month, this figure
roughly translates to a sustained 3% increase. By contrast, a unit increase in competition by chains
is associated with -0.0025 (p < 0.01) fewer 1-star filtered reviews per month. Empirically, having
a new competitor enter can reflect a wide variety of factors, which makes a direct interpretation
of these effects difficult. However, whether that competitor is independent or a chain is plausibly
exogenous. While there could be other factors that are correlated with an indicator for whether
a new competitor enters a neighborhood, we are able to identify the difference between a chain
competitor entering and an independent competitor entering. Therefore, while we are hesitant to
interpret these as standalone coefficients, we can see that having an independent competitor enter
leads to more fake reviews relative to having a chain competitor enter. Overall, our results suggest
that increased competition by similar, nearby, independent restaurants has a statistically significant
and economically substantive impact on negative review fraud.
By contrast, we find that the effect of increased competition by different food-type independent
restaurants is statistically insignificant. In other words, in line with the findings of Auty (1992), our
results suggest that restaurants compete for reputation on the basis of both location and the type
of food they serve. This is in contrast to the results of Mayzlin et al. (2014), who find that hotels
compete with their neighbors, but not on the basis of their quality-tiers. While this inconsistency is
likely due to differences between the two industries, we cannot reject a methodological explanation
since Mayzlin et al. (2014) work in a cross-section setting. Similarly to Mayzlin et al. (2014), we find
that, regardless of food type, increased competition by chains has a moderating effect on negative
review fraud.
To assess the robustness of our results to kernel choice, we estimate the same model using a
uniform kernel with a 1km bandwidth. Our results, shown in the second column of Table 6, remain
largely unchanged. Another set of robustness checks with a bandwidth of 0.5km, shown in Table 7,
did not yield substantially different outcomes.
In our final set of specifications, reported in the third and fourth columns of Table 6, we test
the effect of competition on positive review fraud. Unlike negative fraud, we find no statistically
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significant relationship between competition intensity and positive fraud regardless of food-type,
proximity, or chain affiliation. As before, these results are robust to kernel and bandwidth choice.
6 Conclusion
As crowdsourced information becomes increasingly prevalent, so do concerns that the quality of in-
formation can be undermined when businesses game the system. In this paper, we have empirically
analyzed review fraud on the popular review website Yelp – both documenting the problem and
investigating the conditions under which it is most likely to occur. We show that the problem is
widespread – nearly one out of five reviews is marked as fake, by Yelp’s algorithm. These reviews
tend to be more extreme than other reviews, and are written by reviewers with less established rep-
utations. Moreover, our findings suggest that economic incentives heavily factor into the decision
to commit fraud. Organizations are more likely to game the system when they are facing increased
competition and when they have poor or less established reputations. In this section, we discuss
the implications of our work and directions for future research.
6.1 Improving Fraud Detection Algorithms
Research within computer science has developed a series of tools to identify fake reviews (e.g.,
see Jindal et al. (2010), Akoglu et al. (2013)). These tools have used features of reviews and
reviewers to detect fraud. We see our findings as contributing to this in two ways. First, our findings
can directly enter into fraud detection algorithms. For example, a fraud detection algorithm should
be quicker to go off in situations where a business is most likely to commit fraud. Second, our
findings can help to validate algorithms that are designed to identify fake reviews. Specifically,
consider an algorithm that uses text to identify fake reviews. If an algorithm is not identifying fake
reviews in the situations where businesses are most likely to leave a fake review (for example, when
there is increased competition), then this might raise concerns about the quality of the algorithm.
Clearly, removing low quality content from review platforms is a laudable goal. Yet, one chal-
lenge to implementing a review filtering algorithm is that businesses may feel that it is unfair when
a legitimate review is removed. This type of complaint is often made toward review platforms by
seemingly honest businesses. While we have cross-validated the results of Yelp’s algorithm, such an
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algorithm is necessarily an imperfect science – leading both to false positives and false negatives.
This issue is further complicated by businesses that have anecdotally claimed that review filters
are stricter on non-advertisers than on advertisers.
While a complete analysis of this issue is beyond the scope of this paper, the results from the
second column of Table 1 may shed some light on the issue. In that specification, we include
an indicator for whether a restaurant advertises with Yelp, and also interact this variable with
the main independent variables in the specification – the characteristics of the review, and the
characteristics of the reviewer. While we use this mainly as a control (to allay concerns that Yelp’s
algorithm may differentially affect advertisers), these interaction variables can also help to provide
more direct evidence of how advertisers are treated relative to non-advertisers. We find that none
of the advertiser interaction effects are statistically significant, while the remaining coefficients are
essentially unchanged in comparison to those in Equation 1. While we cannot reject hypotheses
related to differential treatment, we find that neither 1- nor 5-star reviews were significantly more
or less likely to be filtered for businesses that were advertising on Yelp at the time we collected our
dataset. Another limitation of this interpretation is that we do not observe the complete historic
record of which businesses have advertised on Yelp, and hence we can only test for discrimination
in favor of (or, against) current Yelp advertisers. As a robustness check, we repeat this analysis
using only 2012 data, so that the advertising indicator and the reviews we analyze are in line. Our
results, presented in the third column of Table 1, remain unchanged.
An important direction for future research is to investigate both real and perceived fairness
issues related to algorithmic fraud detection.
6.2 Mechanisms to Reduce Fraud
The findings of this paper suggest that there is an extensive amount of systematic review fraud in
online review platforms. It is therefore of first-order importance for platform designers to develop
mechanisms to reduce the amount of fraud. While there is no perfect mechanism that will eliminate
all review fraud, we believe that there are several main mechanisms that can help to reduce fraud.
Here, we suggest four possible approaches to do so. We hope that future work will develop these
and other mechanisms.
First, fraud detection algorithms can identify fake reviews, which allows the market designer to
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eliminate the offending reviews (and potentially to punish the offending business). The advantage
of this is that it is a simple, low-cost approach. However, algorithms can seem to lack transparency
and are inherently noisy. Second, the market designer can only allow verified purchases to leave
a review (Mayzlin et al. 2014). While this can reduce the prevalence of fake reviews, it may also
have the unintended consequence of reducing the amount of legitimate content. Third, market
designers can implement stings (such as the ones studied in this paper). However, this is costly to
implement and can only be done in situations in which businesses are soliciting fake reviews (rather
than writing them themselves). Fourth, one can imagine leveraging behavioral economics to reduce
fraud. For example, if businesses do not inherently see review fraud as an ethical decision, the
platform can highlight the ethical element of decision making every time someone wants to leave a
review.
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Table 1: Characteristics of Boston restaurant filtered reviews.
(1) (2) (3)
All reviews All reviews 2012 reviews
Stars (the reference level is 3 stars)
1 0.035*** 0.035*** 0.052***
(8.50) (8.29) (6.49)
2 −0.022*** −0.021*** −0.018***
(−10.10) (−9.67) (−3.55)
4 0.0031* 0.0030* 0.0085*
(2.24) (2.12) (2.44)
5 0.026*** 0.027*** 0.026***
(11.38) (11.21) (5.79)
log(Review length) −0.016*** −0.016*** −0.028***
(−10.83) (−10.03) (−8.17)
log(User review count) −0.096*** −0.097*** −0.081***
(−84.45) (−81.19) (−36.56)
User has photo −0.41*** −0.41*** −0.35***
(−156.60) (−152.17) (−82.91)
Stars × Yelp Advertiser
1 −0.0054 0.036
(−0.34) (1.40)
2 −0.0058 −0.014
(−0.61) (−0.72)
4 0.00076 −0.0076
(0.13) (−0.58)
5 −0.011 −0.012
(−1.46) (−0.75)
log(Review length) × Yelp Advertiser −0.011 −0.012
(−1.72) (−1.04)
log(User review count) × Yelp Advertiser 0.0073 0.0083
(1.80) (1.09)
User has photo × Yelp Advertiser −0.0012 −0.0075
(−0.11) (−0.45)
N 316415 316415 66174
R2 0.43 0.43 0.33
Note: The dependent variable is a binary indicator of whether a specific review was filtered. All models include
business fixed effects. Cluster-robust t-statistics (at the individual business level) are shown in parentheses.
Significance levels: * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001.
Table 2: Characteristics of Yelp users whose reviews were published compared to Yelp users
whose reviews were filtered.
Consumer alert recipients Boston restaurants
Published Filtered Published Filtered
User review count 108 3 137 10
User friend count 66 2 61 5
User has profile photo 77% 20% 82% 4%
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Table 3: Summary statistics at the restaurant-month level.
Independents Chains All
Published reviews per month
1-star 0.10 0.10 0.10
(0.37) (0.37) (0.37)
5-star 0.39 0.17 0.37
(1.03) (0.59) (1.00)
Filtered reviews per month
1-star 0.05 0.03 0.05
(0.28) (0.20) (0.27)
5-star 0.11 0.05 0.10
(0.43) (0.26) (0.42)
Reviews with user profile photo per month
1-star 0.07 0.08 0.07
(0.29) (0.31) (0.29)
5-star 0.31 0.14 0.29
(0.86) (0.51) (0.84)
User review count
1-star 8.30 9.99 8.45
(62.98) (65.73) (63.24)
5-star 40.64 21.63 38.93
(165.47) (113.15) (161.55)
Sum of review lengths (in characters) per month
1-star 127.72 105.90 125.76
(532.31) (492.06) (528.85)
5-star 321.96 124.85 304.22
(961.84) (492.84) (931.09)
Independent competitors 0.5km
Same food type 7.52 6.77 7.46
(15.59) (11.30) (15.26)
Different food type 41.59 54.43 42.75
(43.08) (49.04) (43.81)
Chain competitors within 0.5km
Same food type 0.77 1.80 0.86
(2.05) (3.40) (2.23)
Different food type 5.59 8.46 5.85
(7.88) (8.85) (8.01)
Observations 167594 16572 184166
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Table 4: The effect of own reputation on positive (5-star) review fraud.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dependent variable: 5-star filtered 5-star filtered 5-star filtered 5-star filtered
reviews per month reviews per month reviews per month reviews per month
1 month lag
1-star reviews 0.012*** 0.013*** 0.012*** 0.012***
(4.78) (4.77) (4.69) (4.70)
2-star reviews 0.007** 0.006** 0.007** 0.007**
(3.10) (2.92) (3.18) (3.18)
3-star reviews −0.000 0.000 −0.000 −0.000
(−0.17) (0.29) (−0.19) (−0.19)
4-star reviews −0.004*** −0.004** −0.004*** −0.004***
(−3.31) (−3.03) (−3.38) (−3.38)
5-star reviews −0.014*** −0.011*** −0.015*** −0.015***
(−4.83) (−4.48) (−5.00) (−5.00)
log Review count −0.021*** −0.020*** −0.020*** −0.020***
(−7.89) (−7.37) (−7.95) (−7.88)
6 month lead
1-star reviews −0.004
(−1.80)
2-star reviews 0.002
(1.06)
3-star reviews −0.000
(−0.22)
4-star reviews −0.001
(−1.26)
5-star reviews −0.007*
(−2.55)
Business age (years) 0.006* 0.005* 0.031*** 0.031***
(2.57) (2.35) (3.55) (3.54)
Chain restaurant −0.008** −0.008**
(−3.28) (−3.28)
Claimed Yelp listing 0.012***
(4.80)
Model Fixed effects Fixed effects Random effects Random effects
N 180912 162063 180912 180912
R2 0.66 0.68 0.67 0.67
Note: Cluster-robust t-statistics (at the individual business level) are shown in parentheses. All specifications con-
tain controls for various review attributes which are not shown. The number of observations N is smaller than that
reported in Table 3 since lag and lead variables are included.
Significance levels: * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001.
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Table 5: The effect of own reputation on negative (1-star) review fraud.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dependent variable: 1-star filtered 1-star filtered 1-star filtered 1-star filtered
reviews per month reviews per month reviews per month reviews per month
1 month lag
1-star reviews 0.001 0.002 −0.000 −0.000
(0.31) (0.70) (−0.18) (−0.18)
2-star reviews −0.003 −0.003 −0.003* −0.003*
(−1.71) (−1.96) (−2.00) (−2.00)
3-star reviews −0.000 −0.000 −0.001 −0.001
(−0.29) (−0.19) (−0.56) (−0.56)
4-star reviews −0.000 −0.001 −0.001 −0.001
(−0.59) (−1.09) (−0.80) (−0.80)
5-star reviews 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001
(1.26) (1.28) (0.94) (0.94)
log Review count −0.003* −0.003** −0.004*** −0.004***
(−2.51) (−2.64) (−3.35) (−3.30)
6 month lead
1-star reviews 0.002
(1.13)
2-star reviews 0.000
(0.30)
3-star reviews −0.000
(−0.20)
4-star reviews 0.001
(1.47)
5-star reviews 0.000
(0.67)
Business age (years) 0.002 0.001 −0.000 −0.000
(1.43) (1.17) (−0.00) (−0.01)
Chain restaurant −0.002 −0.002
(−1.83) (−1.82)
Claimed Yelp listing 0.001
(0.87)
Model Fixed effects Fixed effects Random effects Random effects
N 180912 162063 180912 180912
R2 0.68 0.69 0.68 0.68
Note: Cluster-robust t-statistics (at the individual business level) are shown in parentheses. All specifications con-
tain controls for various review attributes which are not shown. The number of observations N is smaller than that
reported in Table 3 since lag and lead variables are included.
Significance levels: * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001.
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Table 6: The effect of competition on review fraud (kernel bandwidth 1km.)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Gaussian Uniform Gaussian Uniform
Dependent variable: 1-star filtered 1-star filtered 5-star filtered 5-star filtered
reviews per month reviews per month reviews per month reviews per month
Independent competitors
Same food type 0.0016*** 0.0013*** 0.00094 0.00065
(3.33) (3.32) (1.34) (1.06)
Different food type 0.000074 0.000068 −0.00029 −0.00013
(0.64) (0.77) (−1.43) (−0.79)
Chain competitors
Same food type −0.0030* −0.0025** −0.0023 −0.0023
(−2.53) (−2.64) (−1.20) (−1.43)
Different food type −0.0011* −0.0011** 0.00076 0.00028
(−2.18) (−2.78) (0.88) (0.42)
N 180912 180912 180912 180912
R2 0.68 0.68 0.66 0.66
Note: Cluster-robust t-statistics (at the individual business level) are shown in parentheses.
Significance levels: * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001.
Table 7: The effect of competition on review fraud (kernel bandwidth 0.5km.)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Gaussian Uniform Gaussian Uniform
Dependent variable: 1-star filtered 1-star filtered 5-star filtered 5-star filtered
reviews per month reviews per month reviews per month reviews per month
Independent competitors
Same food type 0.0012*** 0.00094** 0.00044 0.00030
(3.43) (3.26) (0.89) (0.77)
Different food type 0.000043 −0.000058 −0.00031 −0.00022
(0.41) (−0.67) (−1.63) (−1.40)
Chain competitors
Same food type −0.0026** −0.0016* −0.0021 −0.00082
(−2.74) (−2.29) (−1.38) (−0.72)
Different food type −0.0010* −0.00049 0.0013 0.0010
(−2.33) (−1.49) (1.75) (1.80)
N 180912 180912 180912 180912
R2 0.68 0.68 0.66 0.66
Note: Cluster-robust t-statistics (at the individual business level) are shown in parentheses.
Significance levels: * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001.
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Table 8: Characteristics of Boston restaurants compared to busi-
nesses that have received a Yelp consumer alert.
Boston restaurants Consumer alert recipients
Rating 3.5 2.6
Review count 86 18
Filtered count 17 65
Pct. filtered 19% 79%
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